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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respond·ent,

Case No.
vs.

9281

THEODORE I. GEURTS,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
While appellant's statement of facts is fairly accurate, as far as it goes, still it portrays them in a manner most sympathetic to appellant's cause. In addition,
it fails to set forth many necessary facts, particularly
those pertaining to Count 2 of the Accusation upon
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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which appellant was found guilty of nmalfeasance in
office.'' They should be considered in the determination of this appeal.
Appellant endeavors to infer that the only thing
really involved was the taking by Commissioner
Geurts of three yards of top soil. He then intimates
that this top soil was merely sprinkled on the roots
of some trees and shrubs being hauled to his home,
thereby doing a favor for the city since this en.abled
the city employees to get rid of them at a location more
convenient than the City Dump. He fails to mention,
however, that none of the trees and shrubs were given
to Commissioner Geurts by the original owners of
the graves from which they were removed. All the top
soil, trees and shrubs, with possibly the exception of
one tree-reverted to the City and could have been
used in the beautification of the Cemetery or of city
owned parks.
Moreover, when the trees and shrubs removed
from the graves were not used in connection with
the landscaping and beautification of city property, they generally were taken out by attaching a
chain to them and pulling them out with a truck.
They then were hauled to a trash pile in the cemetery
until it was convenient to haul a full truck-load to
the City Dump. In this case, however, each tree and
shrub taken to the home of Commissioner Geurts and
that of his son-in-law was balled, transported and
placed in holes prepared for it, all of which took
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the time of at least two city employees working on city
time and using city equipment.
Appellant tries to show that the top soil in question merely was sprinkled on the roots of the trees and
shrubs to protect them as they were being hauled in
the truck to the Commissioner's home. This suggestion is made in spite of the fact that all of the trees and
shrubs in question had already been balled. Furthermore, regardless of the amount of top soil involvedand the evidence indicates there was a considerable
quantity-it took the time and labor of city employees working on city time and using city equipment to
dig it OU!t of the mountains, load it, and haul it to the
City Cemetery; then, to reload it; and finally, to haul
it to the home of Commissioner Geurts (Tr. 99-127).
The facts are also that Commissioner Geurts on
at least one occasion personally directed a city employee to plant one of the trees (Tr. 125). It is uncontroverted, furthermore, that on another occasion
he directed one of the city employees to dig up and
transplant some bridal wreaths for him (Tr. 119). In
short, in his recitation of facts appellant failed to set
forth much of the conduct indulged in by Commissioner Geurts which no public official charged with a
public trust should have done.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
Appellant relies on nine points which responSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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dent will answer in the same order in which they are
presented by appellant.

POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
FOR PURPORTED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CHARGING STATUTE.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS AS TO THE MEANING OF
THE TERM "MALFEASANCE" IN OFFICE.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING
AGAINST APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS COUNT I.
POINT IV.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANT THE RIGHT TOTAKE DEPOSITIONS PRIOR TO TRIAL OR TO
HAVE A PRELIMINARY HEARING.
POINT V.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A MISSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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TRIAL AS TO COUNTS 2 AND 3 AND HIS
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
POINT VI.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
THE CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE OF JUROR WILSON.
POINT VII.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL BECAUSE OF ANSWERS GIVEN
BY JURORS IKEDA AND JENSEN ON
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION.
POINT VIII.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVERRULING APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS TO
CERTAIN QUESTIONS ASKED BY THE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY.
POINT IX.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION IN ARREST OF
JUDGMENT.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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FOR PURPORTED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CHARGING STATUTE.
One of the points stressed heavily by appellant
is that the statute under which he was removed from
office for "malfeasance" is so "vague, indefinite and
uncertain" as to deny him "due process of law" as
guaranteed by Section 7 of Article 1 of the Constitu . .
tion of U tab.
In a labored effort to support his contention that
the charging statute is unconstitutional, appellant cites
several cases dealing with statutes and ordinances
struck down because they did not recite with sufficient
particularity the precise conduct which would subject
the offender to criminal punishment. Those cases are
not in point here. They deal with criminal statutes
and ordinances sqbjecting the offender to criminal
punishment. The statutory provision here involved
simply is a procedural statute for removal of public
officers for ''malfeasance in office''. It does not in . .
volve criminal punishment.
As pointed out by this Court in Sk'een v. Craig,
31 Utah 20, 86 Pac. 487,
"We think it reasonably appears from the
provisions of the Constitution and Revised
Statutes referred to, that their object is not to
punish delinquent and unfaithful public officers as for crimes, but to protect the public
against the rapacity and unscrupulousness of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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such officials, who, by their official misconduct, have forfeited their right to continue in
the positions of public trust to which they have
been elected or appointed.''
Appellant suggests that if the Legislature wanted
to make provision for the removal of public officers
for "malfeasance in office" it should have laid down
standards of conduct by which a person reading the
statute could determine what was intended. Appellant fails to mention and possibly even failed to consider that it was not the Legislature which provided
that pu blic officers should be removed for "malfeasance", but the framers of the Constitution.
4

Article VI, Section 19 of the Constitution of
U tab provides in part as follows:
''The Governor and other State and Judicial officers, except Justices of the Peace, shall
be liable to impeachment for high crimes, misdemeanors or malfeasance in office * * *
(Emphasis supplied.)
Section 21 of that same Article then provides as fol-lows:
"All officers not liable to impeachment
shall b·e removed for any of the offenses specified in this article, in such manner as may be
provided by law." (Emphasis supplied.)
''Malfeasance in office,'' then, is one of the offenses for which the Constitution declares public officers "shall be removed." Title 77, Chapter 7, Utah
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Code Annotated 1953, merely establishes the method
and procedure for their removal. It is only this procedural statute that appellant attacks as unconstitutional. He does not attack or even mention the constitutional provision which requires that p~blic officers shall be removed for ''malfeasance in office''.
The term "malfeasance in office" is a recognized
common law offense and a term of long usage. Courts
consistently uphold statutory provisions as being suf ...
ficiently certain if they employ terms of long us.age or
with a recognized common law meaning. Connolly v.
General Canst. Co., 269 U. S. 385, 46 S. Ct. 126,
70 L. Ed. 322; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 34 S. Ct. 853, 58 L. Ed. 1284;
Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 33 S. Ct. 700,
57 L. Ed. 1232.
The Constitutional Convention and the members
of the Legislature which enacted the statute recognized
that the term "malfeasance in office" was one of long
usage and one designating a common law offense. This
is shown by the fact that the Constitution states in
Section 21 of Article VI, without further definition or
clarification that all officers not liable to impeachment
"shall be removed" for any of the offenses specified in
this article, (including Section 19) and by what the
Legislature did in carrying out its constitutional mandate to provide a method and procedure for removal
for malfeasance.
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The Legislature further provided in Section 761-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, that,
''The omission to specify or affirm in this
Code any ground of forfeiture of a public office, or other trust or special authority conferred
by law, or any power conferred by law to impeach, remove, depose or suspend any public
officer or other person holding any trust, appointment or other special authority conferred
by law, does not affect such forfeiture or power,
or any proceeding authorized by law to carry
into effect such impeachment, removal, deposition or suspension.''
It is a fqndamental rule of constitutional construction that terms employed therein must be given
the meaning which they possessed at the time of the
framing and adoption of the instrument. Courts must
give effect to constitutional provisions according to
their language and obvious intent. Utah Builders,
Supply Co. v. Gardner, 86 Utah 250, 39 P. 2d 327,
103 A. L. R. 928. Nothing could be plainer than that
the framers of the Utah Constitution intended that
public officers should be removed from office for
''malfeasance in office'' in such manner as provided by
law.
The common law recognized ''malfeasance in
office'' as a public offense, and the meaning which
that term possessed at the time of the adoption of that
instrument is the meaning which mutst still be placed
upon it. The Legislature very wisely refrained from
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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detailing all the various and sundry acts which might
constitute "malfeasance in office", first, because of the
almost impossible task of doing so, and second, because they were proscribed in interpreting that term
differently than the common law meaning it had acquired at the framing and adoption of the Constitution. It must be presumed that the framers of the Constitution drafted it with utmost care and with a full
and complete understanding of the terms employed
therein.
Mere difficulty in ascertaining the meaning of
words will not invalidate a statute. Pacific Coast
Dairy v. Police Court, (Cal.), 8 P. 2d 140, 80
A. L. R. 1172. To make a statute sufficiently certain
to comply with the constitutional requirements it is
not necessary that it furnish detailed plans and specifications of the acts or conduct prohibited. As pointed
out by Justice Crockett in State v. Packard, 122 Ut.
369, 250 P. 2d 561, ''The limitations of language are
such that neither absolute exactitude of expression nor
complete precision of meaning are to be expected and
such standard cannot be required."
True, this does not relieve the Legislature from
the necessity of setting fair and understandable standards of conduct, but this, we contend, was properly
done in enacting the statute in question.
Since the test of constitutional legislation in this
area is similar in most jurisdictions, respondent hopes
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to provide some assistance to the court by citing several
leading cases in other states.
While the matter before the court was civil with
criminal procedure, the statements below are applic~
able here in that a lesser standard is required in civil
actions than in criminal ones, and if the statute in
question satisfies the constitutional requirements as to
criminal proceedings, it certainly satisfies them as to
those civil in nature.
To comply with the constitutional requirements
of du~ process of law, the crime for which a defendant
is being prosecuted must be clearly defined, but it is
only necessary that the words used in the statute be
well enough known to enable those persons within its
reach to understand and correctly apply them.
"To make a statute sufficiently certain to
comply with constitutional requirements, it is
not necessary that it furnish detailed plans and
specifications of acts or conduct prohibited."
People v. Smith, (Cal.), 92 P. 2d 1039.
For example, the courts have upheld statutes employing such terms as "to make diligent effort to find
the owner'', Pacific Coast Dairy v. Police Court,
(Cal.), 8 P. 2d 140, 80 A. L. R. 1217; "unreasonable speed", Ex Parte Daniels, (Cal.), 192 P. 442, 21
A. L. R. 1172, "unjustifiable physical pain or mental
suffering", People v. C.urtis, (Cal.), 300 P. 801;
"practice law", Peopl'e v. Ring, (Cal.), 70 P. 2d 281;
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and "to the annoy,ance of any other person", People
V. Beifuss, (Cal.), 67 P. 2d 411.
It is contended that the section is uncertain, vague
and indefinite; that in defining an offense the legislature must use language that will not deceive the common mind.
The answer to such contention is that it is neces ..
sary only that the words used in the statute be well
enough known to enable those persons within its reach
to understand and correctly apply them. To make a
statute sufficiently certain to comply with constitutional requirements, it is not necessary that it furnish
detailed plans and specifications of the acts or conduct
prohibited. Lorenson v. Superior Court, (Cal.), 216
P. 2d 859.
"In determining whether a penal statute is
sufficiently explicit to inform those who are
subject to it what is required by them, the courts
must endeavor, if possible, to view the statute
from the standpoint of the reasonable man who
might be subject to its terms." Pacific Coast
Dairy v. Police Court of the City and County
of San Francisco, (Cal.), 8 P. 2d 140, 80 A.
L. R. 1217.
Inasmuch as the language employed in the statute under attack is clear and the words are such as a
person of average intelligence can understand, it must
be held that there is no want of certainty or definiteness about it.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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But mere difficulty in ascertaining the meaning
of words employed or the fact that the language is ambiguous will not invalidate a statute. Pacific Coast
Dairy v. Police Court, supra.
It must be tvpheld unless its nullity clearly, positively and unmistakably appears. Lockhe·ed Aircraft
Corporation v. Superior Court, (Cal.), 171 P. 2d 21,
166 A. L. R. 701. Neither is a statute void for vagueness and uncertainty if its meaning may be inferred or
because the legislative intent might have been declared
in plainer terms. 50 Am. Jur. 489, 490; Hunt v.
State, (Ind.), 146 N. E. 329; People V. Darby,
(Cal.), 250 P. 2d 74 3.
The acts and conduct of appellant were set forth
with meticulous detail and particularity. It would be
difficult to find a reasonable person who would not
immediately recognize the presence of "malfeasance"
on the part of a pwblic official who wilfully and corruptly received for his perso·nal gain and benefit trees,
shrubs and top soil hauled to his home by city employees working on city time and using city equipment and
who directed that at least one of the trees be planted
by a city employee and that another city employee
dig up and transplant some other shrubbery in his
yard. Such a series of acts so clearly comes within the
scope of "malfeasance" on the part of a public official
as to require little further comment.
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The statute providing for the removal of public
officers for "malfeasance in office" is not so vague, indefinite and uncertain as to be unconstitutional.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS AS TO THE MEANING OF
THE TERM "MALFEASANCE" IN OFFICE.
Closely related to his first point is his second, that
the instru,:tion given to the jury as to the meaning of
"malfeasance" was so vague, uncertain and indefinite
as to force the jury to rely upon a purely subjective
standard. Appellant argues that ''perhaps one member
of a jury might think a Commissioner should attend
every Commission meeting, and that a commissioner
was guilty of malfeasance if he were absent for a day''.
Appellant concludes his argument on this point by
stating that "malfeasance requires a guilty knowledge
and an intent to do wrong in all cases and not mere
inadvertence, negligence or even failure to know the
1aw '' .
It is difficult to conceive of language which
would more perfectly meet the requirements suggested
by appellant for properly defining "malfeasance" than
the language which actually was employed in this
case. Count 2 of the Accusation as modified by the
Bill of Particulars was precise and exact as to the acts
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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constituting the ''malfeasance" of appellant. The
Court thereafter defined the term ''malfeasance'' in
language, as appellant himself concedes, taken from
other cases decided by this Court, which language, incidentally, embraced the common law definition of
that term. The Court then went on to instruct the
jury in No. 3 as follows (R. 44) :
·'Before you are warranted in finding the
defendant guilty as to Count 2, the State must
prove to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements which constitute the accusations set forth therein:
1. That said defendant from on or about February 1, 19 59, did wilful! y and corruptly
receive for his personal gain, benefit and advantage certain property belonging to Salt
Lake City Corporation; or,
2. That said defendant during said time aforesaid did wilfully and corruptly receive for
his personal gain, benefit and advantage the
labor of Salt Lake City employees while
they were regularly employed by Salt Lake
City Corporation in and during the regular
course and scope of their employment, for
which labor they were paid out of Salt Lake
City funds; or,
3. The wrongful use of Salt Lake City equipment;

4. That during the period of time stated aforesaid defendant was the duly elected, qualified and acting Commissioner of the City
of Salt Lake, State of Utah;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
5. That said act, or acts, by the said defendant at the time and place charged herein
was done consciously as a wrongful act in
his official capacity with the knowledge
upon his part at the time of doing the same
that it was wrongful and that he had no
right to do the same, or in lieu of said
wrongful act, the defendant did an unlawful act.
nit is not sufficient that the State prove
one or more of these elements but it is necessary,
in order to justify a finding against the defendant on said Count that each and every one of
the elements enumerated in Cournt 2, and, one
or more of the alternative elements aforesaid be
proven to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon failure of proof of the
elements as aforesaid beyond a reasonable doubt
the defendant is entitled to an acquittal."
This instruction certainly did not, as appellant asserts
in his brief at page 24, leave it up to the members of
the jury to determine whether under their own standards of right and wrong appellant was guilty of
''malfeasance in office''.
The court then cautioned the jury even further
in Instruction No. 6 (R. 49):
"You· are instructed that in order to authorize a removal from office, the act of which
the officer is accused must be positively unlawful, or must involve some evil or wrongdoing
on his part which must be known to him to be
so when the act is committed. To commit the
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act of malfeasance in office it is not necessary
that he be convicted of a crime, or that he have
a criminal intent at the time of committing the
act, unless the act committed and relied upon
for malfeasance is a crime, in which case he must
have a criminal intent, nor is it necessary that
the defendant have an intent to defraud at the
time of committing the act in question.''
·'As you will observe from these instructions there are several ways of committing malfeasance in office. One way is to commit an act
that is wrongful in which there must exist a
showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant at the time of committing the wrongful act knew that the act so committed was
wrongful and that he had no right to commit
the same.''
''Second! y, if the act committed is evil the
same sho~ving of conscious wrongdoing must
likevvise exist in the mind of the perpetrator at
the time of the commission of the act. This,
and the commission of the act in question, must
be shown
beyond a reasonable doubt in all sit.
,,
uat1ons.
"Thirdly, if the act relied upon by the
State to constitute the malfeasance in office consists of the commission of a crime, then the perpetrator must commit acts constituting all the
elements that go to make up the crime involved;
namely, the commission of the unlawful act, the
intent to commit the act, and a knowledge upon
the part of the perpetrator that the commission
of the act is a crime. This latter element the law
imputes to every person because the law conconclusively presumes that all persons know the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
law and ignor:ance thereof is no defense or excuse. ''
"It is therefore necessary, to warrant a
conviction of malfeasance in office, that the
State prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of
the elements enumerated in each instance above.
In the event there is a failure upon the part of
State to prove each and all of the said elements
constituting the malfeasance relied upon, then
the .defendant is entitled to a verdict of not
guilty."
The Court further instructed the jury that mere mistakes in judgment .and their personal opinions as to
the proper conduct of the office had no place in their
deliberations. In Instruction No. 7 the Court said in
part ( R. 5 1 ) :
''To ju~tify the removal of a public officer for malfeasance in office as a result of high
crimes, misdemeanors, or malfeasance committed by him it is necessary for the State to show
beyond a reasonable doubt that the act which
the defendant has been accused of is positively
unlawful or involves some evil or wrongdoing
on his part which must be known to him to be
such when he committed the act or acts."
''In other words, mere mistake in judgment or unorthodox handling of public affairs
would not justify removal from office. Your
personal opinions as jurors as to whether or not
the defendant has conducted the office as it
should be conducted or whether or not he
shou'ld be re-elected to this post have no place
in your deliberations. Unless you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused has
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been guilty of offenses done with an evil motive or conscious wrongdoing, or an act that is
unlawful, you should acquit him on all of these
counts.''
It must be presumed that the jury followed the
foregoing instructions of the District Court. Contrary to the assertions of appellant, the jury could not
possibly have found that he was guilty of "malfeasance in office" for "being absent for a day", deciding a
discretionary matter in "one way whereas he should
have decided it in another way", for mere "inadvertence'' or for ''negligence'' as the appellant argues.
The instructions as given represent a most conscientious and realistic application of the facts in this
case to what would constitute the common law offense
of "malfeasance in office". A careful reading of those
instructions evidences the care and skill exercised by
the District Judge in putting them into understandable
language.
Appellant concedes that the instruction given ob
viously was picked from language used in Law v.
Smith, 34 Utah 395, 98 Pac. 300. In describing the
various offenses for which a public officer could be
removed from office Judge Frick had this to say:
''Both under the Constitution and under
the statute it is provided that officers of the
class to which respondent belongs may be removed upon three grounds, namely, for high
crimes, for misdemeanors, and for malfeasance
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in office. It therefore was not intended that,
before an officer is subject to removal from
office, he must be found guilty of some high
crime or misdemeanor; but, if he is found
guilty of some act or acts which constitute malfeasance in o{fice, it is sufficient to remove him.
In order to authorize a removal from office,
however, the act of which the officer is accused
must be positively unlawful, or must involve
some evil or wrongdoing on his part which
must be known to him to be so when the act
is committed.''
In 43 Am. Jur. at page 39, the term "malfeasance'' is defined as follows:

'' * * *

Malfeasance, as ground for
removal of a public officer, has reference to evil
conduct or an illegal deed, the doing of that
which one ought not to do, the performance of
any act by an officer in his official capacity that
is wholly illegal and wrongful. * * *"
Without any apparent constitutional qualms the
Supreme Court of Florida said in State ex ref. Hardie
v. Coleman, 155 So. 129,
''Malfeasance has reference to evil conduct
or an illegal deed, the doing of that which one
ought not to do, the performance of an act by
an officer in his official capacity that is wholly
illegal and wrongful, which he has no right to
perform or which he has contracted not to do.
Words and Phrases, First, Second, Third and
Fourth Series, malfeasance; Webster's New lnterna tional Dictionary.''
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In Sims v. Moeur, 19 P. 2d 679, the Arizona
Supreme Court adopted as its legal definition of malfeasance the following expression:
''Evil doing; ill conduct; tbe commission
of some act which is positively unlawful; the
doing of an act which is wholly wrongful and
unlawful; the doing of an act which the person ought not to do at all."
See also People v. Schnieder, (Colo.), 292 P.
982; State v. Langley. (Ore.), 323 P. 2d 301;
Daugherty v. E !lis, (W. V a.), 9 7 S. E. 2d 3 3; State,
ex rel. Atty. General v. Lazarus, (La.), 1 So. 3 61;
Lawhorn v. Robertson. (Okla.), 266 P. 2d 1008;
Beck v. Young, (Neb.), 48 N. W. 2d 677; Wyson v.
Walden, (W.Va.), 52 S. E. 2d 392; State v. Ellenstein. (N.J.), 2 A. 2d 454; State v. Winne, (N.J.),
91 A. 2d 65; State v. Ward, (Tenn.), 4 3 S. W. 2d
21 7; and the cases decided by this Cou·rt and cited by
appellant and respondent.
An additional allegation of error in appellant's
Point II is that the court below failed to establish a
proper standard of right and wrong. Appellant s.ays
malfeasance requires actual guilty knowledge and intent to do wrong in all cases.
This does not appear to be the current law in
this jurisdiction. Atwood v. CoxJ 88 Ut. 437, 55 P.
2d 377, a case decided later than the Law case, indicates that such knowledge might be imputed in using
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the following words at page 393: "* * * that
he must have done so knowing that he was doing
wrong or at least under such circumsttnces that any
reasonable person who had done the same thing would
have known that he was doing something wrong.''
The jury was properly instructed and no error
was committed harmful or detrimental to the substantial rights of appellant. There was no prejudice.
POINT Ill.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING
AGAINST APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS COUNT I.
It is urged that the District Court erred in not
dismissing Count 1 of the accusation for the reasons,
first, that it was "res adjudicata" and second, that
''the same reasons for dismissal that were present in
the criminal cases were present in the civil case".
The argument asserting "res adjudicata" as a
reason for dismissing Count 1 of the Accusation is
without merit. Count 1 of the Indictment was part
of Criminal Case No. 16525 charging appellant with
commission of a misdemeanor as set forth in Title 10,
Chapter 6, Section 36, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Count 1 of the Accusation, on the other hand, was
part of civil Case No. 124 396, charging appellant
with "malfeasance in office", brought solely for the
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purpose of removing him from office under our removal statute, Title 77, Chapter 7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
The Utah Constitution, providing for removal
of public officers by "impeachment", states in part in
Section 19 of Article VI,

''* * *

judgment in such cases shall
extend only to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or
profit in the State. The party, whether convicted or acquitted, shall, neverth'eless, be liable
to prosecution, trial and punishment according
to law.,, (Emphasis supplied.)
While the constitutional provision quoted above
appears in Section 19 dealing with removal of officers
by "impeachment" and not in Section 21 dealing with
the removal of officers "in such manner as may be provided by Law,'' still, it certain! y would be a ridiculou~
anomaly if an officer removed by "impeachment"
should be liable to prosecution, trial and punishment
according to law, while an officer removed "in such
manner as may be provided by Law" should not be
so liable.
The framers of the Constitution and the members of the Legislature were in accord, moreover, that
public officers removed for "malfeasance in office"
should be liable to prosecution, trial and punishment
regardless of their manner of removal. Upon conviction under Title 77, Chapter 7, Utah Code AnnoSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tated, 1953, the Legislature provided in Section 15,
that "the Court must entc1 a judgment that the party
accused be deprived of his office", and then in Section
16, that,
"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent the officers mentioned from
being proceeded against by information or indictment for a public offense in the same manner as is provided by law for so proceeding
against other persons accused of a public offense.'
Appellant himself concedes that for "res adjudicata" to apply, three conditions must exist: The actions must be bet\\reen the same parties, the issues must
be the same, and, the relief sought must be the same.
Those conditions did not exist.
The Indictment was a criminal action. Upon
conviction thereunder appellant could have been subjected to a fine u!p to $1,000.00. The Accusation was
only a removal proceeding. Conviction thereunder
could not have subjected appellant to a fine but only
to removal from office.
The removal statute is primarily for the purpose
of protecting citizens of a particular body politic. It
was not written with the purpose of punishing a public official and/ or subjecting him to a possible fine as is
the case in a criminal statute.
The Utah case, Sk~en v. Craig, 86 P. 487, sheds
some light on the res adjudicata question. It holds
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that proceedings under a statute virtually identical to
the one involved here are of a civil natu-re even though
containing some criminal procedural steps and that the
relief sought is entirely different than in a criminal
case. A discussion of these matters appears at page
488:
.... ( \

I

•

"We think it reasonably appears from the
provisions of the Constitution and Revised
Statutes referred to, that their object is not to
punish delinquent and unfaithful public officers as for crimes, but to protect the public
against the rapacity and unscrupulousness of
such officials, who, by their official misconduct, have forfeited their right to continue in
the positions of public trust to which they have
been elected or appointed. And it would seem
that, if the object of such proceedings brought
under section 4580 were to punish for the commission of crime, some judgment, other than
that of removal from office only, would have
been provided for and provision made in the
same act for the prosecution of offending officers whose misconduct might escape detection
until after the expiration of their terms of off tee.
* * *"
.
Since one of the proceedings was criminal and the
other civil, even without the aforesaid positive constitutional and legislative declarations that a public official convcted or acquitted under a removal proceeding
shall nevertheless be liable to criminal prosecution and
punishment, the argument of appellant as to "res adjudicata" is still without merit.
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The matter here involved would still appear to
fall squarely within the general rule that a judgment
rendered in a criminal action may not be received in
evidence in a subsequent civil action to bar such action
or to establish the truth of the facts upon which it was
rendered, 30 Am. Jur. 1005.
There is no merit either to the second part of
appellant's argument on this point that the count
should have been dismissed for the same reasons the
similar count in the Indictment was dismissed. In
substance the Accusation charged appellant with wilfully and corruptly having a personal interest in a
contract with the city. Appellant insinuates that this
was a veiled charge of bribery when in fact the only
charge is that he had a personal interest in a con tract
with the city which is prohibited by the provisions of
Section 10-6-38 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reading as follows:
"No officer of any municipal corporation
shall be directly or indirectI y in teres ted in any
contract * * * the * * * consideration of which is paid from the treasury

* * *.

tt

Without detailing the evidence adduced, it is respectfully submitted that there was ample and substantial evidence from which the jury could have
found appellant guilty. Few if any officials actually
guilty would ever admit their interest and guilt. This
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stances and the reasonable inferences to be derived
therefrom. This is a factual determination and should
have been decided by the jury under proper instructions. As said by this Court in Law v. Smith, 34 Ut.

394, 98 P. 300,
"It was for the jury to say, after considering all of the evidence produced in support of
the accusation * * *.''
In that regard, our system of jurisprudence has,
from earliest times, contemplated that a jury of a
man's peers should find the facts of his case, not the
ju!.dge. It is the sole and exclusive province of the jury
to determine the facts whether the evidence offered be
weak or strong, in conflict or uncontroverted. This
applies to both civil and criminal cases and so covers
the matter at hand. State v. Green, 78 Ut. 580, 6 P.

2d 177.
Certainly appellant was not prejudiced since the
Count was dismissed and any possible error thereafter
was cured by the remarks of the Judge at the time and
by his subsequent instruction. He told the Court:
"Gentlemen of the jury, at the end of the
State's case, the defendant made a motion to
dismiss this first count that is charge.d against
the defendant, and I have considered it during
the noon hour and have come to the conclusion
that I would not be warranted in submitting it
to you for your deliberations and determina~
tion, for the reason that there is not evidence
that supports the necessary elements of that
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charge. And I am, therefore, dismissing it and
withdrawng it from your consideration."
"So you will devote your attention to the
second and third counts as they are charged in
the accusation and counsel for the defendant
may now proceed to put on their evidence
* * *." (Tr. 190-191.)
The Judge then in Instruction No. 4 stated:
4 4

* * *

You are instructed, gentlemen of the jury, that you have heard much evidence respecting the first count of this accu5ation and you have also been informed that the
same has been dismissed by me upon motion of
the defendant's counsel. You are, therefore,
instructed that you should disregard all of the
evidence that pertains to that count in your deliberations upon the guilt or innocence of the
defendant respecting counts No. 2 and 3 as now
contained in the accusation. * * *" (R.
47.)
Moreover, the fact that the court forthright! y
dismissed Count 1 may have had just the opposite
effect wpon the jury than that contended by appellant.
The jury, upon hearing the court dismiss the count,
may very well have become impressed not only with
the weakness of that particular count, but with the
State's case generally and have become somewhat more
inclined to rule in appellant's favor upon the counts
submitted to it. This theory is enhanced somewhat
by the actual fact that the jury did bring in a verdict
in favor of appellant as to Count 3 despite the clear
evidence introduced by the State.
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Respondent feels strongly that Count 1 should
have been submitted to the jury under proper instructions for their determination as to the guilt or innocence of appellant. If any error did occur, however,
it certainly was not prejudicial under the cautionary
remarks and instructions given. As pointed out by
this Court in State v. Neal, 1 Ut. 2d 122, 262 P. 2d
756,
''We are also conscious of the fact that a
trial in the Courts of this state is a proceeding
in the interest of justice to determine the guilt
or innocence of the accused, and not just a
game. We will not reverse criminal cases for
mere error or irregularity. It is only where
there has been error which is both substantial
and prejudicial to the rights of the accused that
a reversal is warranted.''
These remarks are equally applicable in civil cases such
as this, as they are in criminal rna tters.

POINT IV.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANT THE RIGHT TOTAKE DEPOSITIONS PRIOR TO TRIAL OR TO
HAVE A PRELl MINARY HEARING.
Appellant's argument that the trial Court committed error in denying him a preliminary hearing or
the right to take depositions prior to trial is without
merit.
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Only by statute is a person entitled to a preliminary hearing. The Utah law gives a person charged
with crime by complaint and information that right.
but specifically denies it to a public official in a removal proceeding. Section 77-1-4 Utah Code Annotated 19 53, provides in part that,
"Every public offense must be prosecuted
by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate unless the examination is
waived by the accused with the consent of the
state, or by indictment, with or without such
examination and commitment, except:
( 1) Where proceedings are had for
the removal of a civil officer of the state,
of a political subdivision thereof, of a
municipality or of a school district.'' (Emphasis supplied.)

The removal statute itself does not grant an officer accused of "malfeasance in office" the right to a
preliminary hearing, nor does it assure the use of depositions. It is a special type of proceeding. Its purpose is to protect the public by providing for the expeditious removal of officials found guilty of "malfeasance in office''. It is not designed to try persons
charged with the commission of crime as in a criminal
proceeding, nor is it designed to adjudicate private
rights of individuals as in the usual civil proceeding.
Commissioner Geurts, on being accwed of ''malfeasance in office" in the case ,at bar, was entitled to
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be informed in the Accusation itself in clear and concise
language of the very acts relied upon as constituting
that offense, which acts in and of themselves must,
as a matter of law, constitute the offense. Law v.
Smith, 34 Ut. 394, 98 Pac. 300.
The Accusation against him met all legal requirements. In addition he was furnished a Bill of Particulars which set forth with even more particularity the
details and evidence of his acts of malfeasance.
It is clear from a careful reading of the removal
statute and the decisions of this Court thereunder that
the "accusation" takes the place of the "preliminary
hearing''. The acc~ation must in and of itself set
forth in clear and concise language those acts which
constitute the common law offense of "malfeasance in
office''. If it does not, the proceeding for removal can
be enjoined by writ of prohibition. See Burke V.
Knox, 59 Ut. 596, 206 P. 711. In this case appellant
sought such writs on two occasions from this Court
and both of them were denied.
The right to take depositions is a right granted
only in civil proceedings governed by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. The removal statute does not grant
the right to take depositions. Nor are they otherwise
provided for by rule, since the removal statute must
be enforced only in accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Appellant was not harmed in any
way by being denied the right to take them. This is
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very clearly pointed out by appellant's own words at
pages 2 7 through 2 9 of his brief. The court should
take particular notice of the following quotation from
page 28:
''Counsel for the defense was certain in his
own mind that the district attorney had no such
evidence, as we believed that we had talked to
all of the witnesses that knew anything about
this particular rna tter. According! y, we filed a
demand with the district attorney for a list of
all of the witnesses whom he would use to
prove Count 1 (R. 8). * * *"
In other words, counsel for appellant had already
obtained all the information necessary to the prosecution of his case since he had interviewed all of the witnesses. There remained the further opportunity, moreover, to talk with all witnesses whose names might
thereafter be turned over by the district attorney in
response to his demand.
Appellant claims, too, that he knew in advance
what evidence would be introduced as to CoUlnt 1 and
that, in fact, it came into the trial just as he knew it
would (A. B. 28). Counsel does not profess to be a
mind reader and this knowledge could only have been
obtained by careful scrutiny of the State's witnesses.
Therefore, no depositions were necessary nor
could they have given any further light to appellant
beyond what he professed to have.
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POINT V.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL AS TO COUNTS 2 AND 3 AND HIS
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
In appellant's contention that the District Court
committed error in not granting a mistrial as to
Counts 2 and 3 and in not granting his motion for a
new trial, he presents nothing not already presented in
his arguments at his Points III and IV. The denial of
his motion for a mistrial and of his motion for a new
trial was not an abuse of discretion by the trial Judge.
The rule that this Court will not reverse a ruling of
a District Court unless there is a gross abuse of discretion has been announced so often as to need no citation of authority. Clearly there was no abuse of discretion. The substantial rights of appellant were not
prejudiced.

POINT VI.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
THE CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE OF JUROR WILSON.
Rule 47f(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure covers the question presented and dealt with under this point.
" ( 6) That a state of mind exists on
the part of the juror with reference to the cause,
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or to either party, which would prevent him
from acting impartially and without prejudice
to the substantial rights of the party challenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a
juror by reason of having formed or expressed
an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, founded upon public
rumor, statements in p~blic journals or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the
Court that the juror can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him."
The following portion of the transcript containing the questions of the trial Judge and the answers
given by Wilson will clearly show that the Judge acted
well within his discretion in denying the challenge for
cause to juror Wilson (Tr. 20-23):
"THE COURT: Mr. Wilson, what is
your occupation?
''MR. WILSON: I am retired.
''THE COURT: And before you retired,
what did you do?
'MR. WILSON: I worked in the wholesale lumber business for the Utah Lu,mber Company.
"THE COURT: And I presume you
have heard through the press and radio and
some discussions, publications of City affairs
and probably about the filing of this accusation, have you?
"MR. WILSON: Yes, sir, I have.
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"THE COURT: And from what you
have read and heard and general gossip and
talk, have you formed or expressed any opinion
about the merits of this case?
"MR. WILSON: Not to anybody except
my own family. I might say that I was quite
greatly concerned about the accusations that
were made at the time.
"THE COURT: And I don't want to
know what your opinion is, if you; have one.
I say we don't want to know what it is, but
do you at this time have an opinion about the
truth or falsity of these accusations?
"MR. WILSON: I have an opinion but
I might be able to change it in case the evidence
showed it wrong.
"THE COURT: Do you believe that it
would require evidence to remove the opinion
that you have now?
''MR. WILSON: I think so.
"THE COURT: Do you agree with the
rule of law that a man is presumed innocent
until he is proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt?
"MR. WILSON: Yes, sir, I do.
''THE COURT: And you likewise agree
with the rule of law that if the State should
prove the truth or accuracy of these accusations
that they are entitled to have a finding made in
their favor?
''MR. WILSON: That is right. I believe

it.
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"THE COURT: And if you were accepted as a juror, would you conduct your duties as a juror along those lines?
~~MR.

WILSON: I would do so.

"THE COURT: I take it from the questions you have answered that you now are of
the opinion that a man is presumed innocent
until he is proved guilty?
"MR. WILSON: Thaf s true, yes, sir.
"THE COURT: Do you think you
would require more proof of guilt in this instance than you would in any other case where
the same rule of law applied?
''MR. WILSON: Well, I think it is quite
an important case, and I think it should have
sufficient proof, yes.
''THE COURT: Well, Mr. Wilson, I
have made this statement to many jurors, that
every case is important. It all depends upon
who is involved. That is, it is important to the
people that are involved. This case is important
to the State of Utah, and it is important to
Commissioner Geurts, but the case tomorrow
will be important to the State or some defendant there and we should treat every case as
important. But the thing I want to know from
the statement you have made is whether or not
you think this case is of such a nature that you
would require more proof in this instance than
you would in a case tomorrow involving some
other defendant, maybe involving the same
charge?
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"MR. WILSON: Well, if I say yes, I
would say it is because I think public officials
should be above reproach in whatever office
they have been elected to, and that there should
be no suspicion or anything of that kind.
"THE COURT: Well, nobody can quarrel with your statement, but that is not an offense or it is not a ground for removal if a man
is not above suspicion. It must be stronger than
that. It must be that he is guilty of wrongdoing
beyond a reasonable doubt. Now you would
not find this defendant, the issue for or against
him on the matter of suspicion, would you?
"MR. WILSON: No, sir.
''THE COURT: In other words, suspicion really has nothing to do with the trial of
this case.
"MR. WILSON: That's right.
"THE COURT: It is the question of
whether he is or is not guilty of these accusations.
"MR. WILSON: I understand that.
"THE COURT: And even though a
man may be indiscreet or may have done something that you don't approve of, you would
not hold that against him from the standpoint
of finding this issue against him, would you-?
''MR. WILSON: I would not.
"THE COURT: Do you have any mental reservation about whether or not you should
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sit as a juror in this case, as concerns your impartiality?
"MR. WILSON: No, sir.
~~THE

COURT: And if you were a defendant in this case do you think you would
get a fair and impartial trial if you were sitting
on the jury and seven others like you?
"MR. WILSON: I would think so."
31 Am. Jur. 183, pg. 217 states the general rule
as follows:
"According to the majority rule which is
sometimes incorporated in a statutory enactment, a juror who states on his examination
that he has formed and expressed an opinion
about the case which it would take evidence to
remove but who states that he can fairly and
impartially try the case according to the law
and the evidence, and render a true verdict, is
competent to act as a juror, where the court or
triors are satisfied of the truth of his statements.
It is quite natural for prospective jurors to say,
under such conditions, that it would require
some evidence to change their former impressions, but it does not follow that such condition
of mind renders them incompetent.''
In Thiede v. People of th'e Territory of Utah,
159 U. S. 510, a murder case, four jurors testified
that they had read newspaper accounts of the killing
and had formed impressions from them, but each
stated he could lay aside such impressions and try the
case fairly. At that time, the territory had a statute
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similar to our Rule 4 7f ( 6). The court held that the
jurors clearly came within the terms of the statute and
no error occurred.
To the same effect is the case of Hopt v. Utah, 7
S. Ct. 614, 120 U.S. 430. It also held that the judgment of the court as to the competency of the juror,
upon his declarations under the statute then in effect,
w:as conclusive.
In Leick v. People, (Cal.), 323 P. 2d 674, a
murder trial, a juror admitted having an opinion at
the time of the voir dire examination, but said he could
disregard the opinion, listen to the evidence and apply
it to the instructions of the court and that he would
be fair and impartial, under the circumstances. The
court held that to believe or not to believe such a juror
became the problem of the judge. The court said that
if the trial judge is persuaded that the juror will fair 1y
and impartial! y try the issue, his denial of a challenge
for cause should not be disturbed except in the case of
clear abuse of discretion.
In addition to the above reasons for upholding
the exercise of discretion by the trial Court it is submitted that appellant has failed to show that any prejudice resulted to him from the denial of said challenge.
Subsequent to the examination of the ju,ror Wilson,
appellant had an opportunity to use one of his peremptory challenges on said juror, but used it, instead,
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on another. Appellant's only attempt at showing
prejudice is the bare self-serving statement of counsel
that in his opinion there were other more objctional
jurors on the panel than Wilson.
-Respondent has found no cases dealing with this
question in which the counsel for the complaining
party did not later exercise the peremptory challenge
in striking from the panel the so-called objectional
.
JUror.
In Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific R. R., 112
Ut. 189, 186 P. 2d 293, (1947), the juror in question was the mother of one of defendant's witnesses,
an adjuster who investigated the case. Under questioning from the Court she stated that she would be
fair but naturally she was inclined to believe her son.
A challenge for cause was denied, and the juror was
later excused on peremptory challenge. The Court
held that no showing was made at the time of choosing
the jury that the plaintiff desired to use any more peremptory challenges and stated on p,age 19 5,
''Should this Court now permit them to
say they would have used a peremptory challenge on one of the remaining jurors had the
trial Court excused Mrs. Hurd for cause? They
make the contention in this Court that they
would have done so, but to permit the question now to be raised, would allow a party to
willingly ,accept a jury before verdict and then
claim error in the Court because of an adverse
verdict. If an erroneous ruling on a challenge
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for cause has the effect of depriving a party of
a peremptory challenge, this Court will not review the ruling unless the deprivation was of a
challenge that the record affirmatively shows
would have been used. To make this showing
to the trial Judge before the jury is sworn is a
burden we place on the complaining party."
The Court goes to cite from the case of State V.
Thorne, 41 Ut. 414, 126 P. 286, which case in turn
cites from Thompson~ Merriam on Juries as follows:
"Will the law presume prejudice from the
simple facts that the peremptory challenges were
exhausted: Some Courts answer this question
in the affirmative; but, in the opinion of others,
something more must be shown, namely, that
after the peremptory challenges were exhausted
some objectionable person took his place upon
th jury, who would otherwise have been excluded by a peremptory challenge. The latter
seems to be the better view. Conceding the challenge for cause to have been improperly overruled, it is evident that only under such circumstances as just stated can the loss of peremptory
challenge, necessary to cure the erroneous decision of the Court, be said to have worked- an
injury to the challenging party.''
The Court goes on to refer to the case of State v.
Cano, 64 Ut. 86, 228 P. 563. The record in that case
showed that all objectionable jurors challenged for
cause were later removed by peremptory challenges.
The Court held that it was clear that no prejudice
re-.
suited from any of the Court's rulings in regard to
~
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denying the challenges for cause. The Court further
cited the following language from the case of Frank v.

U.S., (C. C. A. 9) 42 F. 2d 623.
"If the defendant is dissatisfied with the
jury or any member of the panel selected to try
the case, he should manifest that fact to the trial
Court, and in the absence of some objection or
request to exercise an additional peremptory
challenge, he ought not to be heard to complain
upon appeal of an error which was corrected by
his exercise of a peremptory challenge to the
juror challenged for cause. If later he found
that because he had thus cured the error of the
trial judge, he would be forced to accept an objectionable juror whom he could not challenge
for cause he should have called the attention of
the trial Court to that fact. The injury to him
was not sustained by the ruling of the Court on
the challenge for cause. If he was thereby injured it would be for the reason that after exhausting his peremptory challenges he was
thereby required to accept an unsatisfactory
.
''
JUror.
It is submitted that in light of the above cases the
appellant has failed to show any prejudice resulting
from the denial, appellant had an opportunity to exercise a peremptory challenge if he thou;ght the juror
objectionable. This he failed to do and he thereby accepted the juror. Appellant's bare assertion that in
the opinion of his counsel there were other jurors more
objectionable than Wilson will not suffice to show
prejudice.
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In view of testimony of juror Wilson that he
would try the case impartially, it is clear that the
judge acted well within the bounds of his discretion
in refusing to disqualify him for cause.
POINT VII.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL BECAUSE OF ANSWERS GIVEN
BY JURORS IKEDA AND JENSEN ON
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION.
The Ikeda matter can be fully answered simply
by referring to his absolute denial of the allegations
made by appellant Geurts' nephew (R. 69).
It appears that the judge either chose to believe
Mr. Ikeda as against young Geurts or that such an
innocent statement, if actually made, really was not
prejudicial to appellant's cause.
On voire dire examination, furthermore, juror
Ikeda passed every test of his qualifications to try the
case impartially.
Appellant puts considerable stress on his allegation that juror Jensen attended and participated in a
certain hearing before the city commission dealing with
an alleged shake-down involving the police department.
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The meeting is not shown by any fact or allega ..
tion to have had any bearing whatsoever on appel ..
lant' s troubles. As a matter of fact, Mr. Geurts was
not the commissioner in charge of the police department and had very little to do with it, the department
being under the direction of Mayor Lee.
Appellant talks about feelings running high as
to commission members, but is unable to show, apparently, any indication of feeling on the part of Jensen against Mr. Geurts, personally.
It may well have been that he was favorably disposed toward Mr. Geurts, since the latter apparently
supported Mayor Lee in many of the proceedings leading to the ouster of the chief of police.
Moreover, the question posed by Mr. Rampton
(A. B. -46) is very vague and uncertain at best and the
logical import of it might well have been only as to
protest meetings involving the ouster of the chief of
police.
Appellant's contention is too tenuous to be a
basis for a new trial. This is especially so, in that appellant has been unable to show how any prejudice
occurred in Mr. Jensen's participation on the jury.
The citations from the legal texts cited below ap·
ply to this problem:
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31 Am. Jur. 125, 143:
"False or misleading information elicited
on voir dire examination results in an illegal
verdict where it is of such character as to in.dicate probable bias on the part of the juror, but
not where it is so insignificant as to indicate
only a remote or speculative influence."
38 A. L. R. 2d 627:
"It is generally recognized that a false answer on voir dire which has the effect of depriving counsel of the opportunity to make a proper
determination whether to exercise the right to
challenge a juror. will not in itself require the
granting of a new trial. Most courts agree that
to justify a new trial it must appear that the
party seeking
it has been prejudiced by the false
,,
answers.
Both as to Points VI and VII generally, regardless of the type of proceeding this is deemed to be,
Rule 4 7f ( 6), Supra~ applies.
It is presumed that jurors having heard a case
and delivered a verdict conducted themselves- prepe·rly
and the presumption is not overcome except by some
definite proof .of mi~corid_uct. Such pr_oof must be adduced by the defendant and must be· of a convincing
nature. Alerano Western Pacific,-5 --Ut. 2d 146, 298
P. 2d 527; State v. Burns, 79 Ut. 575, 11 P. 2d··605.

v.
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POINT VIII.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVERRULING APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS TO
CERTAIN QUESTIONS ASKED BY THE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY.
It is not readily apparent how the district attorney's innocuous and almost rhetorical question could
have done appellant any harm.
Every honest person would have given the same
response to Mr. Banks' question that Mr. Smith did
and his answer was of no significance.
Mr. Smith had succeeded in giving his estimate of
the opinion held by the community as to appellant's
character. His opinion was not shaken or challenged
in any way by the offending question.
As a strict matter of evidence, perhaps it was ill
advised for the district attorney to ask the question
just as he did. However, this court is not interested
in technicalities, but only in seeing that substantial
justice is done. State v. Neal, s~pra.
Since no harm occurred, the point constitutes no
cause for reversal.

POINT IX.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION IN ARREST OF
JUDGMENT.
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The action brought by Mr. Banks as district attorney for the jurisdiction which includes Salt Lake
City was entirely appropriate in every respect.
The action is entitled ''Removal by Judicial Proceeding''. It appears as Chapter 7 of Title 77, U. C.
A. 1953 and has been on our statute books since 1898.
It has been employed from time to time to remove
public officers from their positions for the commission
of high crimes, misdemeanors or malfeasance in office.
Paragraph 2 states that the action is to be initiated by an accusation in writing which "may be presented to the district court by the grand jury or by the
district attorney, or by the county attorney of the
county in which the officer accused was elected or appointed''.
That this is a proper action is indicated in the
opinion of this court in Geurts v. District Court, et al.,
------ Ut. ______ , 352 P. 2d 778, decided June 1, 1960.
Appellant's claim that the indicated statute has
been superseded by Rule 65B (b) ( 1) is unfounded in
law.
The rule dealing with quo-warranto merely gave
expression to the common law right long in existence.
That procedure has never been made exclusive and the
statute is still fully in force. See State v. Barboglio,
63 Ut. 432, 222 P. 904.
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Moreover, quo-warranto traditionally has been
the remedy for removing a person from an office which
he attempts to exercise without right thereto. Its purpose has not been the removal of one, who upon legally attaining to such office, thereafter performs acts
that authorize his being removed by judicial proceed.tngs.
In addition, Rule 81 indicates that the rules (i. e.,
65B (b) ( 1)) shall apply to· all special statutory proceedings, "except insofar as such rules are, by their
nature, clearly inapplicable.,, (Emphasis ours.)
Since this special statutory proceeding, still in
force, declares that the action may be brought by the
district attorney, it is clear that Rule 81 makes Rule
65 inapplicable wherein it supposedly attempts to
lodge exclusive responsibility for prosecuting removal
proceedings in the Attorney General.
Appellant has not been harmed through the action brought by the district attorney and there is no
prejudicial error present. Appellant's point, therefore,
is without merit.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated and in light of the statutes,
cases and texts set forth, the appeal of appellant
Geurts is without foundation and should be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,

WALTER L. BUDGE,
Attorney General,

VERNON B. ROMNEY,
Assistant Attorney General,

JAY E. BANKS,
District Attorney,
Third Judicial District,

QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON,
Assistant District Attorney,
Third Judicial District,
Attorneys for R'espondent.
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